

The tobacco industry, ETS and the hospitality trade

A chronology of tobacco industry obfuscation

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Introduction

The tobacco industry's argument that individuals have a 'right' to smoke is undermined when non-smokers are harmed. Moreover, restrictions or bans on smoking in indoor environments reduce the opportunity to smoke and help to make smoking less socially acceptable. Smoking restrictions also help those people who are trying to stop smoking as there are fewer prompts to smoke. Thus smoking bans have a direct impact on tobacco consumption and negatively affect tobacco industry profits. Therefore it is not surprising that the tobacco industry has embarked on campaigns to oppose smoke-free legislation and has refused to accept (at least publicly) the growing weight of evidence demonstrating the harmful effects of passive smoking. Indeed, the tobacco industry has gone to great lengths to try to undermine the research on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) by employing industry-friendly scientists to question the science on ETS.

Whilst non-smoking is rapidly becoming the norm in most workplaces, smoking is more common in places to which the public have access, particularly leisure and hospitality venues. Consequently, the tobacco industry has sought to influence the hospitality trade's response to regulations for smoke-free environments. The following examples from tobacco company files demonstrate the extent to which the tobacco industry has been prepared to go in order to weaken the case for banning smoking in public places, particularly in pubs and restaurants. Whilst many of the documents refer to campaigns in the USA, there is also a wealth of evidence to show that the same strategy has been used in Europe and elsewhere.

Acknowledgements

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Terminology

Environmental Tobacco Smoke vs passive smoking

Breathing in other people's tobacco smoke is variously referred to as passive, second-hand or involuntary smoking. However, the tobacco industry has preferred to use the less personal 'environmental tobacco smoke' and industry documents suggest that this term was coined in the early 1970s.^{[1](#)}

smokers and non smokers prefer restrictions

Public preferences versus industry profits

It has been clear for many years that, given the choice, people prefer non-smoking environments. In 1982, an industry commissioned report revealed that even smokers actually *preferred* smoking restrictions.

The first conclusion that resulted from the research we conducted is that a majority of adults want smoking restrictions in public places.

What was even more surprising for us to find out that smokers who current[ly] live in regulated areas want restrictions more than do smokers who live in non-regulated areas.

As an example, we asked smokers if they felt smoking restriction should exist in restaurants. Of smokers living in regulated areas, 79% agreed with this statement versus only 36% of smokers living in non-regulated areas. [4](#)

effects on profits

Bans on smoking in public places have a direct impact on tobacco industry income. In 1993 Philip Morris highlighted the threat from restrictions on smoking when it said:

[The] Financial impact of smoking bans will be tremendous. Three to five fewer cigarettes per day per smoker will reduce annual manufacturer profits a billion dollars plus per year."^{[2](#)}

An undated Tobacco Institute document reveals similar concerns:

At a dollar a pack, even the lightest of workplace smoking restrictions is costing this industry 233 million dollars a year in revenue. [3](#)

And in 1982 a report which appears to have been produced for RJ Reynolds warns:

We found that 60% of all office workers have some sort of smoking restrictions at their place of work and a full 22% of workers don't smoke at work at all. The effect on industry volume as a result of these restrictions is obvious. [4](#)

tobacco industry in denial about health effects of tobacco products

Industry denial of health impacts of Second-hand Smoke

The tobacco industry has a long history of denying the health effects of tobacco use. It is only relatively recently that the companies have come to accept some health risks from active smoking but they continue to deny the health risks caused by passive smoking. [5](#)

identifying threats

One of the earliest strategies was to identify key personnel in government or other agencies who represented a threat to their position. In 1984 when Lee Thomas was due to take over as head of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Tobacco Institute said of him and his team:

The good news is that we understand [Thomas] is a reasonable man. The bad news is that under Thomas will be two men in key positions who are known anti-smokers. Joseph Cannon, Assistant Administrator for Air, in charge of the \$75,000 study mentioned in Mr. Milway's comments, and James Repace, who claims that cigarette smoke in the air kills between 500 – 5,000 non-smokers annually. [9](#)

attempt to discredit expert research on ETS.,

James Repace was singled out as a particular threat, not least for his grasp on ETS science:

One month ago, we asked prominent medical researcher, Dr. Sorell Schwartz of Georgetown University, to critique Repace's work. We will use that critique in briefings with EPA officials. [...] We are fortunate to have Dr. Schwartz's assistance. [9](#)

In early 1985 Samuel Chilcote, president of the Tobacco Institute wrote to Wallace Hughes, chairman and CEO of Brown and Williamson (BAT's US subsidiary), to appraise him of progress made on undermining Repace's work on restrictions on smoking in public places:

Our consultant, Dr. Schwartz of Georgetown, has finished his critique of the Repace non smoker "death estimate." In addition, we have gathered full documentation on Repace's anti-smoking activities over the past six years. Our next step will be a visit, immediately, with Barnes, the EPA's deputy administrator- designate, by John Rupp, Schwartz, [and] a partner of John's who is well acquainted with Barnes, and one of our Senate lobbyists. The object is to gain an agency disavowal of the Repace "study," and to encourage a "macro" rather than "micro" (cigarette smoke only) view of indoor air by the agency, to the extent it involves itself in the indoor matter at all. [6](#)

...but internally companies accept evidence on ETS

Subjecting independent research on ETS to a critique was the start of an orchestrated strategy by the tobacco industry to reject evidence that was unfavourable to their viewpoint. However, internal industry documents reveal that tobacco companies did accept the risks associated with side-stream smoke. In 1981, the *British Medical Journal* published a major epidemiological study by Takeshi Hirayama which concluded that non-smoking women married to smokers were more likely to develop lung cancer

than non-smoking women married to non-smokers. The legal advisor to Brown & Williamson reporting on the Hirayama study, stated that both German and British scientists paid by the tobacco industry had reviewed the work and

"they believe Hirayama is a good scientist and that his non-smoking wives publication is correct." (J Wells 1981) [7](#)

Despite appearing to accept, privately at least, that passive smoking was potentially harmful, British American Tobacco maintained a public strategy to refute evidence on ETS:

"All allegations that passive smoking is injurious to the health of non-smokers, in respect of the social cost of smoking as well as unreasonable demands for no smoking areas in public places, should be countered strongly."[8](#)

weakness of the tobacco industry position...

By the early 1980s, there was enough scientific evidence for public health campaigners to assert that ETS was a serious cause for concern – and the tobacco industry found it problematic to continue refuting the evidence. The tobacco industry's realisation that it was ill equipped to counter the medical and scientific profession is evident in the admission made by Samuel D Chilcote:

One of our greatest weaknesses is our lack of qualified medical researchers to help us refute the anti-smokers with legislative testimony, public appearances and articles. Covington & Burling is actively attempting to identify and develop such experts.

[...]

Until then, we must rely mostly on traditional arguments to combat public smoking restrictions.[9](#)

...leads to recruitment of 'tame' supportive scientists

Industry sponsored research

Covington & Burling, the tobacco industry's law firm, went on to run [Project Whitecoat](#), through which Philip Morris screened and recruited a worldwide stable of scientific witnesses who were paid by the tobacco industry to make pro-industry comments on second-hand smoke issues. Their work was "filtered" by industry lawyers to assure it agreed with industry positions.

Work carried out under Project Whitecoat went on throughout the 1980s until the late 1990s, when the scandalous undertakings of the project came to public light. A large part of the project was conceived to counter both scientific evidence and growing public scepticism regarding industry assertions that second-hand smoke was harmless. The Project was clearly intended to influence not only US markets but also those in Europe:

aims to counter evidence on ETS

The Project is designed to support market-level ETS programmes within the PM EEMA[] and EEC markets. The Objectives of these overall ETS programmes are defined as: -*

- End goals:*
- Resist and roll back smoking restrictions
 - Restore smoker confidence
- Pre-requisites:*
- Reverse scientific and popular misconceptions that ETS is harmful.
 - Restore social acceptability of smoking.

Within this overall ETS context the Whitecoat Project comprises two elements:-

Pro-active element:

*a) To generate a body of scientific and technical knowledge in the field of ETS within the PM EEMA and EEC markets. The Project's activities and programmes will include fundamental research, IAQ and IFAQ studies. These will be undertaken by whitecoats, contract laboratories and commercial organisations such as ACVA.[**]*

b) To disseminate and exploit such knowledge within the specific communication programme within these markets

Reactive element:

To provide scientific and technical resources to challenge existing laws, to counter specific legislative and regulatory threats; and to respond to scientific misinformation and bias as it arises in those markets. [10](#)

In order to disseminate this research an organisation called the International Commission on Smoking Issues (ICOSI), which later re-organised as Infotab, was established. Infotab acted as a tobacco industry information clearinghouse collecting articles and legislative information. The founding companies were R.J. Reynolds International, BAT, Philip Morris, Reemtsma, Rothmans, Imperial and Gallaher. Infotab was subsequently renamed the Tobacco Documentation Centre.

front group used to disseminate industry research funded research...

In 1987, INFOTAB embarked on its own ETS Project. Internal documents indicate that the global tobacco companies sought to act in concert to obscure information worldwide about the health effects of tobacco smoke:

"Environmental tobacco smoke is the subject of increasing concern worldwide. To resist the legislation that may result from this concern, the industry should mount an internationally cohesive campaign."

[...]

"Infotab is generating a strategy for managing the ETS issue, to emphasize the doubts that have been expressed in the scientific debate about the alleged hazards of ETS... A common strategic line in many countries simultaneously will have a beneficial effect on the industry worldwide."[11](#)

* EEMA = Eastern Europe, Middle East & Africa

** IAQ = Indoor Air Quality. IFAQ = In Flight Air quality. ACVA = Air Conditioning and Ventilation Associates (Atlantic).

*... and act as
PR tool*

One aspect of Infotab's work included a project to promote 'public affairs materials' to National Manufacturers Associations (NMAs) worldwide. The public affairs materials, provided in the form of a 'campaign guide', were meant to be utilised by NMA representatives when addressing ETS issues, with specific emphasis on:

*ETS and its effect on health
ETS and its effect on women, children, babies and the foetus,
Smoking at work
Smoking in aircraft and other forms of transport
Smoking in restaurants and other parts of the hospitality industry
The contributions of ETS to ambient air quality 11*

The distribution list for the Infotab ETS Project document includes representatives of tobacco interests in Malaysia, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Belgium, Greece, Norway, Argentina, Australia, the United States, West Germany, Sweden, Canada, Finland, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Netherlands, Denmark, United Kingdom, representatives of Rothmans, British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, R.J. Reynolds, Reemstma, Philip Morris and Shook, Hardy and Bacon (U.S. tobacco industry attorneys).

Tobacco industry position on ETS

Despite the mounting evidence of the harmful effects of second-hand smoke, the tobacco industry stuck to its position of denying the science. But by the late 1980s, this position was becoming increasingly untenable.

*joint initiative to
build PR
campaign for
ETS ...*

To present a united front and consistent strategy, cigarette manufacturers from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Canada and Japan met to discuss global strategies for dealing with the industry's potentially greatest threat: the second-hand smoke issue. Lawyers from the law firm Covington and Burling advised that:

"the industry should continue to emphasize the lack of substantive proof of causation." [12](#)

One of the central objectives of this industry joint meeting was to create a version of "marketable science" on ETS. But Dr Franz Adlkofer of the German tobacco industry stated that what the industry was really seeking was

"good public relations material, not good science." 12

*...using covert
methods*

This meeting was convened by the Tobacco Institute, specifically to address the two main objectives: 1) to prevent further bans of cigarette smoking; and 2) to change adverse attitudes to smoking. A Japanese tobacco company executive, remarked that the public health and medical professions:

"[should] be better informed on ETS research," adding that, [...] "in providing this information, the industry must be inconspicuous. Otherwise, the public will suspect the authenticity of the information." 12

Industry admit to lack of public credibility...

By the end of the 1980s, Philip Morris deployed its 'ETS: Science Action Plan' which sought to reverse the scientific opinion and the growing public acceptance that second hand smoke was harmful to non-smokers. In an unusually candid acknowledgement, the author of a Philip Morris report admits to the weakness of the tobacco industry position:

Any strategy must begin with the fact that the Surgeon General and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) -- the pre-eminent health and scientific authorities in the U.S. if not the world -- have concluded ETS is harmful to the health of non-smokers. The tobacco industry has little public credibility and virtually none when compared to these authorities. In order to have any hope of breaking the scientific conclusion on this issue, we should pursue several aggressive programs simultaneously... [13](#)

However, having made the acknowledgement, the same report outlined an audacious eight point strategy to reverse public opinion on ETS. The strategy included measures to disseminate information that categorised second hand smoke exposure as low risk:

... but plans to position ETS as low risk by comparing to other activities

Risks in Context: Whether or not we succeed in discrediting the notion that ETS is a health risk, we can place the risk in context and thereby minimize it. Thus, non-smokers may still believe ETS is a health risk, but on a par with driving a car, shovelling snow, etc. Low risk makes ETS an annoyance issue which can be handled with courtesy and tolerance. Using authoritative sources on risks we would disseminate information on this to the media, political and business decision-makers. [13](#)

The strategy was to include bestowing 'big dollar awards' on scientists and other professionals through their journals and associations for "the best methodological critique of using weak science to make policy". The writer continues, indicating exactly how a critique would be secured:

"Finally, we would identify dozens of statisticians and the like who are willing (for compensation) to attack the ETS research." The cost of these strategies, according to the report would be "in the \$1-2 million range, including outside firms." [13](#)

building alliances with the hospitality trade

Accommodation Program and the Hospitality Industry

Having secured the aid of scientists and statisticians who were willing to promote the industry's propaganda, the next line of attack was to identify potential allies who would be prepared to maintain the "debate" on ETS.

To this end, Philip Morris developed its "Accommodation Program". This was the result of years of alliance building by the tobacco industry with the hospitality trade. Central to the tobacco industry strategy of accommodation is the promotion of self-regulation rather than legislation to avert restrictions

on smoking; making some concessions to non-smokers such as admitting tobacco smoke could be unpleasant; and presenting the installation of ventilation systems as a solution to the ETS problem.

An internal Philip Morris document details the importance of the Accommodation Program in the US experience of staving off restrictions:

The hospitality industry is our greatest potential ally... we need to build a strong and relevant partnership with the hospitality industry.

[...]

The Accommodation Program serves as a link between PM and the hospitality industry. Our ability to interact effectively with the hospitality industry is critical to our ultimate objective, which is to maintain the ability of consumers to enjoy our products in public venues such as restaurants, hotels, bowling centres and shopping malls. This relationship becomes more important as legislative threats continue to mount at local, state and federal levels.

[...]

The Accommodation program provides us with the tool in order to develop and foster key relationships within the [hospitality] industry. [...] It gives us a voice to educate the industry on our issue, and to bring to the forefront some of the economic impact data paints a clear picture of the potential effects of government mandated smoking bans [...] ...we are reliant on the [hospitality] industry to be out in front fighting on this issue. [14](#)

**Extending
programme to
Europe**

By the early 1990s, with smoking restrictions becoming well established in the US, the tobacco industry identified Europe as the next region that was most likely to follow suit. These concerns are apparent in an internal Philip Morris report:

The threat in Europe is serious. France's new law includes a provision which could lead to governmental regulations on the subject, the Dutch government has started an anti-smoking campaign specifically aimed at the workplace, and a company in Belgium specializes in advising companies on how to deal with tobacco. The company is government sponsored and their message is professionally presented; in essence, it says 'ban smoking.' [15](#)

A 1994 Philip Morris presentation describes the company's strategies to fight public health efforts in Europe to reduce second-hand smoke exposure and to counter the activities of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).

EU - 1994/1997 THREAT

THREAT:

EU legislation to ban smoking in workplaces, public places and on transport, driven by IARC ETS study and monograph and ensuing media hype.

--Delay EU legislation

*--Interdict national legislation via EU Resolution on GEP
--Ensure legislation accommodates smokers
--Maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators...
--Build support amongst Pan European groupings of business owners and employees for mobilisation against severe legislation
--Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policy makers.
--Encourage the European Trade Union Confederation to support accommodation vs bans via collaborating on a Pan European workers' attitude survey to demonstrate discriminatory nature of bans and wide support for tolerance in the workplace.*

--Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent (CESI), white collar(CEC) and public sector (CEEP), Unions and the European Personnel Managers Association (EAPM) using US workplace kit.

--Collaborate with the European Tourism Action Group to promote economic impact of bans in Horeca and Transport sectors.

Counter influence of WHO, BASP and anti-cancer groupings.

--Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media including positive scientific studies, public opinion data, favourable legislative developments, economic impact data, libertarian views.

- *Expand ARISE network and through bi-annual attitude surveys (1995-stress in the workplace) generate maximum publicity for ARISE message of pleasure as beneficial to health.*

- *Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs.*

- *Develop PM Communications tool on accommodation to support direct dialogue with legislators and allies.*

- *Encourage opposition to bans within EP.*

- *Encourage European Public Health Alliance and EP Health intergroup to prioritise non-tobacco health concerns with DGV. [16](#)*

fostering good relations with hospitality business

The strategy document clearly communicates Philip Morris's plans to use its hospitality allies to fight regulations on second-hand smoke:

"Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policymakers." 16

A number of industry documents identify the need to mobilise and brief allies such as the hospitality trade, commonly referred to as Horeca.

Objective:

To prevent unacceptable EC workplace and public smoking restrictions by defeating legislative initiative(s) or by assuring favourable wording.

Strategies:

Brief press and relevant public officials

Brief allies: employers, unions and Horeca

Mobilise Smokers' Rights Groups and suppliers [17](#)

Horeca and its significance

Horeca is an acronym for an association of HOtels, REstaurants and CAfes or caterers in the European Economic Community. The hospitality industry association is also seen spelt as "Ho.Re.Ca" or referred to as the Horeca sector.

Tobacco industry documents reveal that the industry attempted to stall the introduction of restrictions in European workplaces, restaurants and public places by employing a wholesale transposition of their experience of the US accommodation program onto the European market:

The HORECA initiative was particularly successful and was adopted or adapted in several European countries. Sometimes it had the effect of making the local national [tobacco] monopolies take up its own initiatives, if only not to be 'shown up' by a foreign company. [18](#)

plans to substitute clean air laws with voluntary self regulation based on accommodation and ventilation

PM's "Three year plan for 1994-1996" included plans to continue relations with hospitality associations and to use these groups to generate and lobby for pre-emptive legislation that would stop the enactment of clean air laws and encourage pro-industry voluntary measures.

In order to avoid adverse national legislation affecting public places and especially [the hotels, restaurants and cafes sector] in the member states which have not yet introduced any legislation, we shall prepare together with the industry associations pre-emptive national legislation and/or voluntary measures and encourage adoption via the [the hotels, restaurants and cafes] associations. Together with the National [Tobacco] Manufacturers Associations, we should prepare and implement restaurant Accommodation Programs in all EC markets... [These programs] should be directed to the restaurant owners via [the hotels, restaurants and cafes] associations to promote reasonable voluntary smoking policies based on principles of accommodation and good ventilation. [19](#)

focus on ventilation and overall air quality deflects from health risks of ETS

The focus on improved ventilation has been central to the tobacco industry's response to the passive smoking problem. Internal industry documents dating back to the mid 1980s make clear that the underlying strategy was to detract from the health concerns surrounding second-hand tobacco smoke by focusing on overall air quality:

We should refocus our efforts against smoking restriction legislation and regulation to a general promotion of comprehensive indoor air quality review and improvement.

[...]

Inadequate ventilation causes several serious problems including fungus and bacterial contamination. These pollutants often cause illness and discomfort which are then blamed on cigarette smoke—a more visible and socially acceptable object of attack[20](#)

ignoring science and focusing on PR and attitudinal surveys

The attempt to deflect attention away from the science and health risks associated with ETS was still evident in the mid 1990s. The three year strategy for the period 1994-1996 for the Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa (EEMA) states:

While the ultimate threat is widespread smoking bans, possibly lead by EC legislation, or global indoor air quality and ventilation standards that penalise smoking, we also risk consumption decreases due to shrinking possibilities to smoke in the workplace as well as a deterioration of the social acceptability of smokers and smoking. With the lack of social acceptability, we will face further problems in ally-building and Government Relations work

[...]

The messages on ETS related issues will focus on solutions and accommodation, rather than on scientific debate. *The already proven strategy to take the initiative in attitudes surveys on issues such as workplace and restaurant smoking will be upgraded.*

[...]

We will endeavour to develop allies particularly among our supplier companies in the HoReCa industry which have a real economic interest in the public smoking debate. This will include ongoing support for and close practical cooperation with the International HoReCa organisation in co-ordination with PMI as well as developing links with national HoReCa groups in key markets. [emphasis added] [21](#)

UK hospitality industry and smoking restrictions

Tobacco industry funded AIR Initiative launched

In February 1997 the Atmosphere Improves Results (AIR) Initiative was launched with the aim of improving the provision of facilities for non-smokers but with the emphasis on improved ventilation. AIR refers to passive smoking as “a live political issue” rather than a health concern. It advocates self-regulation rather than legislation. AIR has received funding from the tobacco industry and was instrumental in persuading the government to adopt a voluntary code of practice to restrict smoking in hospitality venues.

In December 1998, the government set out its policy on smoking in a White Paper “Smoking kills”. Whilst stating that it had no plans to introduce legislation to ban smoking in the workplace, the government said it would consider a code of practice that would restrict smoking in most workplaces and would require the hospitality trade to take reasonable measures to protect workers from exposure to SHS.

UK hospitality industry gains concessions on tackling

However, in response to concerns raised by the hospitality industry about potential loss of trade as a result of smoking restrictions, the government agreed to the establishment of the Public Places Charter. This is voluntary

SHS

code which seeks to increase smoke-free provision. It is designed to meet the needs of customers rather than employees. In order to be compliant with the Charter, caterers can adopt any one of five basic provisions:

- 1 *Smoking allowed throughout*
- 2 *separate areas*
- 3 *ventilated premises smoking allowed throughout*
- 4 *ventilated premises – separate areas*
- 5 *No smoking in public areas*

In March 2000 targets were agreed between the government and trade representatives. These require 50% of all pubs and half of the members of the Restaurant Association to have a formal smoking policy and carry appropriate signage; and that 35% of these policies should restrict smoking to designated areas and/or have ventilation that meets an agreed standard.

*failings in the
Public Places
Charter*

Whilst the Charter Group, representing hospitality trade members, claims to be able to meet these targets, mere compliance with the Charter does not deliver a meaningful reduction of passive smoking health risks:

- The installation of ventilation systems does not eliminate health risks from ETS. Ventilation systems are costly to install, inefficient for the purposes of removing smoke particulates from the air, and would require tornado-strength changes of air to produce acceptable risk for bar staff from passive smoking. [22](#)
- Separate smoking and non-smoking areas are meaningful only if tobacco smoke can effectively be contained in designated areas.
- Initial indications suggest that a substantial number of licensees have sought to comply with the Charter by opting for 'smoking throughout' policy – thus avoiding the need to undertake any measures to address the ETS issue.

*Hospitality
industry and
conflicting
evidence*

Shortcomings in the Public Places Charter were scrutinised by the Greater London Authority's (GLA) Investigative Committee in March 2002. The committee was investigating smoking in public places and found the charter lacking. In its report, the GLA criticised the Public Places Charter for having "low standards", "being too unambitious" and questioned whether ventilation systems were effective. [23](#)

As a counter-offensive, in October 2002, AIR released results of a survey which suggested most pub-goers have a good understanding of what the charter signs mean, and are aware of the Public Places Charter itself. The survey went on to suggest that almost a fifth of people would cease visiting pubs and bars or at least go less frequently if smoking was restricted in pubs. [24](#)

The findings of the AIR survey were immediately refuted by Alistair Aird, editor of the Good Pub Guide, when he said:

This year notices have cropped up in quite a few pubs, asserting that smoking is allowed throughout the premises. These notices have been produced and promoted by an outfit which gets funding from the Tobacco Manufacturers Association. This flies directly in the face of the main purpose of the legislation to prohibit cigarette advertising, which is of course to stop the promotion of smoking itself. [...] I know my readers well and [provision of smoke free areas] is an issue that concerns them greatly. They are looking for somewhere they can eat and drink in a smoke-free environment.

[25](#)

The UK hospitality industry chooses to concentrate on the economic impacts of smoking bans, whilst ignoring the health impacts of second hand tobacco smoke on bar and restaurant workers. A recent survey of 1,700 people found that 64% percent of people working in pubs and bars said they would prefer to work in smoke-free environment. [26](#)

Conclusion

There is consensus among the scientific community that second-hand smoke is a cause of lung cancer, heart disease and other serious diseases. Only the tobacco companies and their allies continue to question the evidence on SHS.

Internal tobacco industry documents show that the tobacco industry has mounted a major campaign to question the scientific evidence on the health impacts of second-hand smoke and to undermine legislative measures to curb smoking in public places.

To assist in its campaign, the tobacco industry enlisted the support of the hospitality trade and helped to fund industry-friendly initiatives focusing on “accommodating” both smokers and non-smokers. In the UK, this is shown most clearly through the example of the tobacco-industry sponsored AIR initiative, which stresses ventilation as a means of dealing with SHS.

Hospitality trade associations have adopted the tobacco industry position of resisting legislation on SHS. They have argued that smoking bans will have a negative economic impact; that a smoking ban will be unpopular with customers; and that ventilation is the credible solution to SHS. This is despite evidence demonstrating the opposite to be the case, i.e. that smoking restrictions are generally good for business; that even smoking bans are popular with the public; and that ventilation is not effective in removing tobacco particulates from typical hospitality venues.

The evidence from tobacco industry documents points to a concerted campaign in the UK (as elsewhere in Europe) to influence the debate on SHS and derail attempts to ban smoking in public places in the UK. The

insistence of the UK hospitality industry on self-regulation, 'accommodation' and ventilation, strongly suggests compliance with the tobacco industry's strategies to avoid smoking restrictions.

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