ASH press release: 00:01 Monday 30 April 2001

Geneva tobacco negotiations in danger of failure -sell-out feared

ASH today warnedgovernments and WHO that the tobacco convention to be negotiated in Geneva thisweek is in danger of serious and irreversible failure - and the opportunity tomount a global response to the tobacco epidemic squandered.  ASH said the bad outlook was due to acombination of:

·        A weak andill-considered negotiating text [see What's wrong with the Chair'stext?].

·        The negativeattitude of the European Union which just wants an agreement on its own narrowterms - no matter how feeble, or what opportunities are lost - [the EU will besticking strictly to measures already agreed at the European level].

·        The newGeorge W. Bush administration with its notorious connections to the tobaccoindustry and evident disdain for international treaties [see briefing on Bush links totobacco]

·        The linksbetween Japan and the tobacco industry - the Japanese government owns JapanTobacco International, which is now implicated in major smuggling allegationsthrough its acquisition of RJ Reynolds' international business and facingracketeering litigation (RICO) brought by the European Union and nine memberstates [see racketeering briefing].

·        Certaindeveloping countries trying to exploit the treaty to claim compensation orotherwise trying to wreck the negotiations.

The Chair's textstarts off weak, but when this is diluted to the common ground between EuropeanUnion, Japan and United States - let alone the other 190 countries - there isalmost nothing left.  Clive Bates,Director of ASH is attending the meeting to lobby delegates for a strongtreaty.  Bates said:

"We expect the US to oppose any seriousadvertising restrictions, we expect the EU to be weak on smuggling, and weexpect Japan to try to block consumer protection measures like a ban onmisleading 'light' branding.  By thetime they've each watered down the text to their liking, there may not be muchleft".     

Some of the EU member states like Britain and Francetalked a good talk, but when it came to it, they just surrendered to thedeadening hand of Brussels.  Britainstarted off promising leadership, but has weakened the EU position by opposingtough action on smuggling."

"The way things are going, we are going to endup with hot air and empty resolutions of good intent. This is the week when wewill find out if governments are simply making gestures or if they have theguts to take on the tobacco industry and really deal with the world's biggestpublic health epidemic."

"The danger is that too many governments and theWHO just want a treaty and any treaty will do. The success or failure this treaty will be judged on whether it banstobacco advertising, protects consumers and tackles smuggling.

Note: ASHmaterials on the FCTC http://www.ash.org.uk/?internationalincluding detailed analysis of theChair's text + overview + two page summary

Contact: CliveBates    +44 77 6879 1237 (mobile)             +41 22 716 1212 (hotel)

+44 20 7739 5902 (ASH office)            ISDN available in London                       

What's wrong with theChair's text? 

The starting point for the second meeting of the IntergovernmentalNegotiating Body (INB) is a Chair's text. The text contains numerous weaknesses and misunderstandings about whatmakes effective tobacco control policy. In some areas, the text could have been dictated by the tobaccoindustry.    A major challenge for thesix days of the meeting will be to remove or improve, or otherwise address thedeficiencies of the Chair's text.

Useless, unenforceable and misguided provisions ontobacco advertising(section G.2) - it is impossible to define advertising targeted at under-18s,all advertising reaches under-18s even if it is targeted at older age groups,and it is, in any case, important to remove advertising for its impact on adultsmokers - many of whom are struggling to break their addiction to nicotine. TheChair's text has US and hence tobacco industry fingerprints all over it. 

Trade before health (D.5 and I.2) - it is extraordinary that WHO andgovernments should draw up a public health convention that places the healthmeasures in a subordinate position to trade liberalisation. These principlesshould be replaced with language that takes a precautionary approach to healthgives health priority over trade. 

Naïve and counter-productive age-18 label for thepack (G.1.d.iv.1) - theidea that putting an age limit on a pack will make any difference to who buysit and uses it is completely simplistic and a tobacco industry tactic aimed atmaking smoking seem more grown up. 

Confusing and misleading tar yields to be printed onpacks (G.1.d.iv.2) - theidea that the machine measured tar yield bears any relation to the tar thatsmokers take into the body is totally discredited (because smokers adjust theway they smoke to obtain a desired dose of nicotine, whereas machines donot).  Though there is plenty ofevidence available, the WHO and the Chair have been supported in theirmisguided ideas by civil servants from the European Union.  The measure simply confuses and misleadsconsumers and should be replaced with meaningful communication of risk.

Oversight of a size specification for labels (G.1.d) - one of the greatest battles hasbeen to force tobacco companies to give up space on the pack for consumer andhealth information, yet this has been completely overlooked.

Half-hearted anti-smuggling measures (I.1-7) - the scale of tobacco fraud isso vast and financial losses so great that much more substantial measuresshould be justified.  These should includemeasures to secure and supervise the distribution system, strict liabilityapplied to tobacco companies for excise losses and a comprehensive tracking andtracing regime.  This should be backedby trade sanctions against non-signatories. The text is a failure of ambition on the part of the Chair and WHO.

Ineffective anti-smuggling markings (I.3.a) - the proposal to have batchnumbers and other production information on the pack betrays a shallowunderstanding of the illicit trade and naivety about how such measures could becircumvented and counterfeited.  Forexample, what happens when a tobacco company defines a 'batch' as three months'production from a factory, which would be shipped to 20 wholesale customers insix countries?  It would comply with theconvention but be thoroughly useless for tackling smuggling.

Excessive and ill-judged focus on age and youthaccess (I.8-12) - theChair and WHO closely follow the ideas of Philip Morris and BAT in stressingmeasures that supposedly prevent under-18s having access to cigarettes.  Though most evidence suggests such measuresare ineffective (or counterproductive because they make smoking seem more grownup), their main purpose is to please politicians.  Teenagers are most influenced by the adult world they aspire toenter - this is one of the most basic ideas in tobacco control, but has beenoverlooked in the text.

Licensing of retailers (I.13) - the text calls for licensing retailers, butthere is little evidence that this would be more effective than say large finesor other deterrents for breaking the law on smuggling or under-age sales.  Once again the Chair and WHO have tried toinsist that 'one-size-fits-all' and failed to respect the diversity of circumstancesfaced by the parties.

Protocols negotiations delayed unnecessarily (all) - the text says that the COP shouldnegotiate protocols.  This means thatnegotiation cannot begin until after entry into force of the Convention, whichmay be some years away.  This is justneedless delay - negotiation of protocols should begin in parallel with theConvention and be conducted by the INB.

Implied agricultural compensation (D.4) - the text suggests that tobaccofarmers may be compensated for lost output or assisted with 'transition' - thiswill drag the negotiations into a stalemate of impossible compensation demandsblocking public health measures.   Asthe 'business-as-usual' prevalence of tobacco use is expected to grow from 1.2to 1.7 billion users by 2020 it is hardly likely that there will be a drop inworld demand.  No part of the tobaccoindustry should be receiving any compensation for the consequences of a publichealth treaty.  Diversification shouldbe managed through the normal modalities of development assistance - such asWorld bank sector adjustment, bi-lateral aid and national economic strategy.

No serious financial mechanism (Q.2) - the text suggests a voluntarymechanism supervised by WHO.  Whichdeveloped country would hand over money in such a manner?  Any country with voluntary money to spendwould naturally want it spent bilaterally. Countries act multilaterally where they all agree to do so together, andso that there are no free riders.

Numerous vague provisions (many) - far too much of the text uses"appropriate measures" (= whatever you want); "to the extentpossible" (= down to and including nothing); "within means at theirdisposal" (= if they can be bothered).

What'sgood about the Chair's text?

There are a number of positive elements to the Chair's text of course.

• Potential for protocols to deliver more detailed measures (subject to political will)
• Ban on duty free sales
• Ban on light and mild branding
• Ban on misleading claims
• Warnings in national language
• End market destination marking  as an anti-smuggling measure
• Some capacity building and expertise exchange
• Co-operation in research and education
• General support for tobacco control and smoking cessation

Unfortunately, many of the good items in the Chair's are those mostlikely to be opposed by US, European Union or Japan.

ENDS

ASH

20 April 2001